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SHADOW OF THE FUTURE, RISK AVERSION,
AND EMPLOYEE COOPERATION
Mattijs Lambooij, Andreas Flache, and Jacques Siegers
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine whether and how the shadow of the future
and risk aversion affect employee cooperation with the employer. We
distinguish, formalize and test two conflicting arguments as used in the
literature, which we denote the reward argument and the relation argu-
ment. Whereas the reward argument predicts that risk aversion affects
cooperation in a negative way, the relation argument predicts a positive
effect of risk aversion on cooperation.We show that both arguments are
consistent with the view that a longer shadow of the future increases
cooperation. Hypotheses are tested against survey data obtained from
two samples of Dutch employees (N =109 and N = 213, respectively).
The results suggest moderate support for the relation argument.
KEYWORDS • cooperation • organizations • risk aversion • shadow of
the future
1. Introduction
It is a key challenge for work organizations to motivate their employees
to invest effort at levels that go beyond what can be contractually spec-
ified or formally enforced. Long-term labor relations are an important
governance instrument to achieve this goal (cf. Tsui et al. 1997; Baron
and Kreps 1999). A long-term labor relation generates an ongoing
exchange between employer and employee that gives both parties a
‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod 1984) that provides the incentive to be
cooperative in the present situation in order to secure the partner’s con-
tinued cooperation in the future.
From the perspective of rational agents, however, cooperation in
ongoing exchanges is not without problems. A central problem is the
uncertainty as to whether future rewards for present investments will in
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fact be attained. For example, a firm may go bankrupt, or the employee
may need to quit the job for personal reasons, before the reward is due.
This risk is highlighted by theories that describe the labor relationship
as a social exchange with delayed reciprocation. Integrating efficiency
wage models (e.g. Akerlof 1982) and classical social exchange theories
(e.g. Homans 1961; Blau 1964), Tsui et al. (1997) have proposed a
‘mutual investment’ model of the employer–employee relationship.
Broadly, the mutual investment model predicts that employees will
cooperate more if the employer invests more in ‘career enhancement’ for
the employees, e.g. professional training or promotions. The underlying
argument is that by making investments, the employer induces employ-
ees to invest in the labor relationship themselves, in order to balance the
exchange. This is derived from the notion taken from social exchange
theory that every relationship can be viewed as an exchange, which the
actors in the relationship strive to balance in order to make sure that the
relationship will continue. More specifically, the mutual investment
model distinguishes between two layers of exchange. The first layer is
the formal exchange of time for money, the second layer is constituted
by an informal exchange that goes beyond the range of formal obliga-
tions. The mutual investment model predicts that when employers give
their employees more than is specified in the contract, employees will
be cooperative towards the organization, i.e. they respond with more
effort than they are formally required to invest. This informal exchange
can be found in the realm of career management in particular. When
employers are willing to invest in careers of employees (‘career
enhancement’), employees are predicted to show more cooperative
behaviors in return. A central mechanism that drives this prediction is
that the (delayed) reward of a career move is much more impactful than
a series of short-term rewards.
As Molm (1994) has pointed out, every exchange relationship bears
risk, and so does the specific exchange between employer and employee
as portrayed by the mutual investment model. By postponing career
enhancement rewards by way of compensation for the cooperative
behavior of employees, a time lag is introduced. With this time lag,
uncertainty enters the decision-making process of employees. When an
employee decides to invest extra effort to cooperate with the firms’ inter-
est, it may well be that between the moment of investment and the future
reward some unexpected event occurs due to which the reward will not
be obtained. This problem implies that the risk1 attitude of employees
will be an important condition for the success or failure of career
enhancement. Most people generally prove to be risk averse, i.e. they
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prefer a certain outcome to a risky outcome with the same or – to a
certain extent – even a higher expected value (see e.g. Herzog and
Schlottmann 1990; Doucouliagos 1995; Donkers, Melenberg, and Van
Soest 2001; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005). At the same time, there is
evidence for considerable differences between people in the degree of
risk aversion (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
Risk aversion may explain why effects of career management are not
always as straightforward as expected. For instance, Doucouliagos (1995)
concludes that many workers, consumers, managers, and investors are, to
a certain extent, risk averse and that this makes many people reluctant to
start up or invest in new firms. Bloom and Milkovich (1998) argue that
considering the entire compensation contract of the employee, studying
risk may even be more important than studying incentives per se in order
to understand effects of long-term rewards on the effort of employees.
Furthermore, theoretical and experimental analyses of cooperation in
repeated social dilemma games have provided evidence that the risk atti-
tudes of individuals clearly affect their willingness to be cooperative
(Raub and Snijders, 1997; Snijders and Raub 1998, Van Assen 1998).
Repeated social dilemma games are, in turn, considered to be a model of
the continued exchange in a long-term labor relation (cf. Baron and
Kreps 1999). However, while previous research leaves little doubt that
individual risk attitudes affect cooperation in long-term labor relations,
the exact nature of these effects is far from evident.
There are broadly two lines of thought in the literature pertaining
to the issue of how risk attitudes affect long-term labor relations. Baron
and Kreps (1999) discuss a mechanism that we will call the ‘reward’
argument. From the point of view of the reward argument, risk aversion
may affect an employee’s willingness to cooperate, because the invest-
ment in cooperation with the employer made by an employee can be
seen as a gamble on his part. The employee pays some effort now to
obtain an uncertain reward, such as a promotion, in the future. If an actor
is risk averse, he may prefer the certain outcome of no investment (and
no reward) to the uncertain gamble between a payoff that is worse,
investment without reward, and a payoff that is better, investment with
reward, even if the certain outcome and the gamble have the same
expected value. To explain, in utility theory risk aversion commonly
refers to a preference that actors have for obtaining some outcome x for
certain, above playing a gamble with equal expected value x that
involves some probability p of earning a payoff higher than x, but also
the risk of getting a lower payoff than x with probability (1 − p). For a
risk-averse player, if the expected outcome of the gamble equals x, the
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possibility of getting a higher payment than x in the lottery is not enough
to offset the risk of ending up with less than x. As the popular proverb
has it: ‘A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.’ However, a risk-
neutral actor would be indifferent as to the gamble and obtaining x for
certain, because both outcomes have the same expected payoff.
For the reward argument, this suggests that the more risk averse
employees are, the more weight they place upon the uncertainties that
may disrupt the link between effort investment and future rewards. Risk-
averse employees may be deterred in particular by the possibility that
they (or the employer) will have to quit the working relationship unex-
pectedly, before the time has been reached when the reward will be
granted. The suggestion that follows from this theoretical view is that
delayed rewards need to be higher for risk-averse employees than for
risk-neutral or risk-seeking employees. Or, when the reward and the
delay are fixed, this suggests that employees are less willing to cooper-
ate the more risk averse they are.
Raub and Snijders (1997; Snijders and Raub 1998) represent what we
call the ‘relation’ argument. The implications of this argument with
regard to effects of risk aversion are radically different from those of the
‘reward’ perspective. In the relation perspective, the labor relationship is
characterized by ongoing reciprocity. That is: at any point in time,
employer and employee alike will face the decision to cooperate or
defect, but either party also knows that they will take these decisions vis-
à-vis each other repeatedly in the future. The model of the labor rela-
tionship that corresponds to this view is that of an indefinitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). It is a well-established fact that a sufficient
shadow of the future may deter rational agents in this game from unilat-
eral defection in the present, because they anticipate the undesirable con-
sequence of losing the cooperation of others in the future. As a result,
conditional cooperation is an individually rational strategy on this con-
dition (cf. Friedman 1971; 1986; Axelrod 1984). Raub and Snijders have
shown that, contrary to the reward argument, this model implies that risk
aversion favors cooperation, or, conversely, that risk seeking undermines
cooperation (Raub and Snijders 1997; Snijders and Raub 1998; Van
Assen 1998). As the authors argue, in indefinitely repeated social
dilemma games, risk aversion favors cooperation, because in ‘a repeated
game-framework using the logic of conditional cooperation … [t]he rel-
evant problem for … a rational actor is whether he should try a unilateral
exploitation of partners who cooperate conditionally. He has to weigh the
short-term incentive for exploitation against the expected long-term costs
of such a behavior. In a scenario of this type, risk aversion will favor own
310 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 21(3)
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cooperation, while risk-seeking preferences will tend to favor defection’
(Raub and Snijders 1997: 278−279). Here, the gamble involves risking
losing the partner’s cooperation in order to reap the benefits from
exploitation of the partner. When this gamble yields the same expected
value as continuation of mutual cooperation, a risk-averse player would
prefer the latter option although the payoff of unilateral defection
exceeds that of mutual cooperation.
The reward argument and the relation perspective are both consistent
with Tsui et al.’s (1997) emphasis on the importance of long-term
rewards for employee cooperation in ongoing labor relations.At the same
time, the theories generate conflicting predictions on how individual risk
aversion affects employee cooperation under the shadow of the future.
This discrepancy sets the stage for our research. One could expect that
for different types of organizations, using different types of incentive
systems, risk aversion may lead to different behaviors, depending on
whether the incentive structure corresponds more to the relation or to the
reward model of an employer–employee relationship. One-shot long-
term rewards such as becoming a professor, or granting the employee the
status of partner in a law firm, may work differently from long-term
rewards with more, but smaller steps, such as repeated training sessions
or the gradual advancement on a promotion ladder in smaller steps.
In this paper, we use game theoretical elaboration of both theoretical
arguments to generate corresponding testable hypotheses. We show how
the predictions of each of the theories correspond to a different form of
the incentive structure that the employee faces in the labor relationship,
which in turn may be linked to different types of organizations to which
each of the two theories applies. We then report a set of empirical stud-
ies in which these hypotheses were tested on questionnaire data that we
obtained from two samples of Dutch employees (total N = 322). The
game theoretical models and the corresponding hypotheses are presented
in section 2. In section 3, we will describe the data, measurement, and
the statistical methods used. Section 4 reports results of the empirical
analysis. Results are discussed and conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2. Models and hypotheses
2.1 Modeling the reward argument: the delayed reward game
To express the intuitive reasoning of the reward argument in a more for-
malized way, we specify a delayed reward game that models the
employer–employee relationship as it is seen from the point of view of
LAMBOOIJ ET AL.: SHADOW OF THE FUTURE, RISK AVERSION 311
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the reward perspective. Baron and Kreps’ (1999) reasoning mainly
focuses on the perspective of the employee who faces the decision prob-
lem whether to invest in cooperation with the employer, at the risk of not
obtaining the promised reward in the future. A full game theoretic analy-
sis in the tradition of the principal-agent approach would model the fea-
tures of the contract offered by the employer as the outcome of a rational
choice of the employer anticipating the employee’s rational behavior
under the contract. To simplify our analysis, we assume in the following
as given that the employer has offered a contract with the specified fea-
tures and we focus only on the decision problem of the employee. We
argue that this is sufficient to answer our question as to how risk aver-
sion of the employee affects the employee’s cooperation. Hence, for the
delayed reward game, we assume that the employer has chosen ratio-
nally to enter into a binding contract with the employee in which it is
specified that at some (fixed) time t* > 1 in the future the employee will
receive a reward R* (e.g. promotion) if the employee has cooperated in
all rounds up to and including t*. If the employee did not cooperate in
any of the rounds up to and including t*, after t* he receives no reward,
i.e. a payoff of zero.
In every round, the employee’s decision is to cooperate (C) or defect
(D). Cooperation is costly, defection is not. We model the risk for the
employee by a certain probability that if he cooperates, and thus will
incur costs, there will nevertheless be no reward. More technically, we
assume, as in Raub and Snijders, that after every round the game may
continue with a fixed probability, α. This probability captures the
shadow of the future in the sense that the higher α, the higher the prob-
ability that the reward will eventually be attained, if the employee has
cooperated throughout the game. The first round at t = 0 will always
be completed.
Adopting the method of Raub and Snijders (1997) for the delayed
reward game, we model risk aversion in terms of a concave shape of the
utility function over the stage game payoffs, −c (costs of cooperation), 0
(defection or no reward), and R* (reward). Figure 1 shows why a concave
utility function over the stage game payoffs implements the assumption
that risk-averse actors may prefer the certain payoff of defection (0) to a
gamble with probability p of ‘winning’ the reward R* and probability
(1 − p) of ‘losing’ and ending up with nothing but the invested costs for
cooperation (−c). For sake of simplicity, we will assume throughout the
remainder of the paper that risk preferences do not affect the utility that
an actor derives from the worst-case outcome and the best-case outcome
of the stage game. That is, in the delayed reward game U(−c) and U(R*)
312 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 21(3)
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are not affected by an actor’s risk preference, and U(−c) < U(0) < U(R*).
The straight line connecting the payoff–utility pairs (−c, U(−c)) and
(R*, U(R*)) in Figure 1 represents the expected payoff of a lottery in
which the actor wins the worst-case payoff –cwith probability (1−p), and
the best-case payoff R* with probability p. The higher the probability of
winning, the closer the expected utility uL(p) = (1−p)U(−c)+pU(R*) is to
the highest utility U(R*), and the smaller the probability of winning, the
closer the expected utility is to U(−c). Figure 1 shows two concave2 util-
ity functions U and V. Both functions implement risk aversion in the
sense that whichever lottery p is chosen, the utility of getting the corre-
sponding expected payoff for certain, U((1−p)(−c)+pR*), exceeds the
expected utility of playing the lottery, uL(p) = (1−p)U(−c)+pU(R*). This
implies that in particular a lottery q that has the same expected payoff as
defection (0) yields a lower utility for a risk averse actor than defection
itself. Alternatively, for a risk averse actor the probability p of getting the
reward R* must sufficiently exceed q to make this lottery more attractive
than the option of defection.
In the following, we will derive for the delayed reward game the con-
dition under which it is individually rational for employees to cooperate
in all rounds. Subsequently, we will analyze how this condition changes
when risk aversion is varied. As a first step, we obtain the expected util-
ity of perpetual cooperation, uC. This utility is the sum of two compo-
nents. Its first element is the expected utility of obtaining the reward at
time t*, pRU(R*), where pR is the probability that the round t* of the game
will be reached. A player who chooses perpetual cooperation also
expects to obtain the utility of investing the cost of cooperation, U(−c),












U(R ∗) = V(R ∗
R ∗
Figure 1. Concave utility functions implementing risk averse preferences in
the range of possible stage game payoffs of the delayed-reward game
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for the expected number of rounds lc that the game will continue before
it ends, either at t*, or at some earlier point in time. Accordingly, we
obtain uC as given by equation (1).
uc = pRU(R*) + lcU(−c). (1)
Given full cooperation, the probability that the reward is attained, pR,
equals the probability that the game continues after every iteration until
round t*, or
pR = α t* (2)
The expected number of rounds for which the investment of full cooper-
ation with the corresponding utility of U(−c) is made, lc, is obtained as
(3)
The proof is given in the appendix. The condition under which the
employee chooses to cooperate in all rounds of the game is that uC>uD,
where uD denotes the best possible payoff that an employee can obtain
when deviating from perpetual cooperation. This payoff can never be
higher than in the case where the employee defects immediately from
the first round on. The employee will then obtain the stage game utility
of defection, U(0), times the expected duration of the game, lc. In addi-
tion, the employee will receive once more after round t* a payoff of zero
with utility U(0), but only with the probability α t* that this round of the
game is reached. Hence, uD = lcU(0) + α t*U(0). With this, we find after
some rearrangement that the condition for the rationality of perpetual
cooperation uC > uD, is equivalent to the condition given in (4).
(4)
The proof is given in the appendix. Further analysis of this result shows
that this condition become less restrictive when α increases and more
restrictive when t* increases (for proof see appendix). In other words, the
higher the probability that organization membership continues and the
earlier the reward is due, the less restrictive are the conditions under
which a rational employee cooperates in all rounds of this game. For the
sake of convenience, let us interpret the difference between the left-
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attractiveness of cooperation for the employee. Formally, the attractive-
ness of perpetual cooperation in the delayed reward game is given by
.
To obtain hypotheses about actual behavior, we take the attractiveness of
cooperation as an indicator of the likelihood that an employee cooperates.
We assume that this likelihood is zero when condition (4) is not satisfied,
but otherwise it strictly increases in the attractiveness of cooperation.3
With this interpretation, we can reformulate our result in terms of a rela-
tionship between two continuous aggregate level variables. This yields the
first hypothesis of our study (see formal derivation in the appendix).
Hypothesis 1. Employees will cooperate more with their employers
if the shadow of the future is longer.
2.2 The relation model: the indefinitely repeated PD
In the following, we will show that hypothesis 1 is not only consistent with
the reward argument but with the relation argument as well. As was done
in earlier studies, we will describe the labor relationship from the point of
view of the relation model as an indefinitely repeated PD game with stage
game payoffs for the employee of T, R, P, and S, where T corresponds to
unilateral defection (don’t work but get a reward), R to mutual cooperation
(work and get reward), P to mutual defection (employee does not work
and employer does not pay the reward), and, finally, S to unilateral coop-
eration (employee works but employer does not live up to his promise to
pay the reward). As in the reward model, risk aversion is modeled in terms
of a concave utility function over the stage game payoffs, with utilities of
U(T) > U(R) > U(P) > U(S). Again, we model the shadow of the future
with the assumption that the game may continue after every iteration with
probability α. The well-known condition for the individual rationality of
mutual perpetual cooperation in this game (see, e.g., Raub and Snijders
1997, who take this from Friedman 1971; 1986) then is:
(5)
where U(x) represents the utility that an actor derives from obtaining the
payoff x in the stage game. The condition for cooperation given in (5)
is obtained from the Nash-equilibrium condition for the individual
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rationality of mutual cooperation based on so-called trigger strategies
(Friedman 1971; 1986). LikeAxelrod’s Tit-for-Tat, a trigger strategy starts
with cooperation, but unlike it, the trigger strategy imposes perpetual pun-
ishment after any defection by the opponent. The advantage of analyzing
trigger strategy equilibriums is that the rationality of cooperation based on
trigger strategies is a necessary condition for the rationality of any form
of cooperation based on reciprocity. If the punishment imposed by a trig-
ger strategy is not sufficient to deter defection, no punishment can be
severe enough (cf. Raub and Snijders 1997: 269). Clearly, condition (5)
shows that perpetual cooperation is individually rational if the shadow of
the future (α) is sufficiently long, but cooperation is not rational if α is too
small. This is in line with our hypothesis 1, if again we adopt the inter-
pretation that the difference between the l.h.s. and r.h.s. of the inequality,
α−α∗ is an indicator of the attractiveness of cooperation and that the prob-
ability of cooperation strictly increases in attractiveness, but is zero for
negative attractiveness. It should be noted though that condition (5) makes
perpetual cooperation possible, but not inevitable. According to the well-
known ‘Folk theorem’ of the theory of repeated games, ‘if the players are
sufficiently patient then any feasible, individually rational payoffs can be
enforced by an equilibrium’ (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991: 51) in an indef-
initely repeated PD game. However, as argued above, the cooperative
equilibrium we address here is of particular interest, because it allows
assessing the conditions under which mutual and perpetual cooperation
based on reciprocity can be individually rational at all.
2.3 Risk aversion and employee cooperation under
the reward model
The delayed reward game highlights that long-term rewards imply a time
lag between behavior and rewards. With this time lag, uncertainty enters
the decision-making process. To derive implications from this model for
the effects of risk aversion on cooperation, we introduce into the analy-
sis of the conditions for cooperation the effects of risk aversion on the
utilities of the stage game payoffs. This requires that we can compare
different utility functions with each other with regard to the degree of
risk aversion imposed by the utility function. Various measures have
been proposed for this purpose, most prominently the Arrow–Pratt mea-
sure of absolute risk aversion (e.g. Pratt 1964). However, for our pur-
poses, a simpler approach suffices. In the delayed reward game, the most
important substantive property of risk aversion is that the employee
prefers obtaining with certainty the ‘interior payoff,’ zero, to a gamble
316 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 21(3)
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involving the two ‘exterior payoffs’, −c and R*. Correspondingly, in the
repeated PD game risk aversion affects how actors evaluate a lottery that
involves the three payoffs that shape condition (5), P and T as the exte-
rior payoffs and R as the interior payoff. Thus, the more that, for a given
utility functionU, the utility of obtaining an interior payoff with certainty
exceeds the utility of the gamble with the same expected value that
involves the two exterior payoffs, the more risk aversion this utility func-
tion imposes, given our simplification that risk aversion does not affect
the utility derived from the worst and the best stage game outcomes in
conditions (4) and (5), respectively. This implies the following definition.
Definition 1
Consider two concave utility functions U and V defined on the range
of payoffs [P..T] for the repeated PD game, or [−c .. R*] for the delayed
reward game. Let U(P) = V(P) and U(T) = V(T) for the repeated PD
game, and U(−c) = V(−c) and U(R*) = V(R*) for the delayed reward
game. Then, the risk aversion of U is higher than the risk aversion of V
if for any payoff x in the corresponding interval, U(x) > V(x).
This definition implies that for any gamble involving the two exterior
payoffs, the higher the risk aversion of a utility function, the more the
utility of obtaining with certainty the expected value of the gamble
exceeds the expected utility of the gamble. Figure 1 illustrates definition
1 for the delayed reward game. The risk aversion of utility function U in
this figure is higher than the risk aversion of utility function V, because
for any possible payoff between the best and the worst stage game out-
come, the corresponding utility of U is higher than the corresponding
utility of V. This implies that if this payoff represents the expected value
of some lottery involving these two stage game outcomes, the utility
gain of obtaining the expected value with certainty rather than playing
the lottery is higher for function U than for function V.
Definition 1 straightforwardly implies that higher risk aversion affects
the restrictiveness of the condition for cooperation in the delayed reward
game. The higher the risk aversion of a utility function U, ceteris paribus,
the larger the term on the r.h.s. of inequality (4), which represents the dif-
ference between the utility obtained from defection and the utility derived
from unilateral cooperation, U(0) − U(−c), divided by the difference
between the utility obtained from getting the reward and the utility of a
zero payoff, U(R*) − U(0). At the same time, the term on the l.h.s. of con-
dition (4) is not affected by risk aversion ofU. This implies that the higher
the risk aversion of a utility function, the smaller is the set of values of
LAMBOOIJ ET AL.: SHADOW OF THE FUTURE, RISK AVERSION 317
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α and t* for which condition (4) is satisfied, or the lower the attractiveness
of cooperation, all other things being equal (for proof, see appendix). We
have thus shown that higher risk aversion makes the conditions for coop-
eration more restrictive from the point of view of the reward model.Again
using the interpretation that the likelihood of cooperation increases in the
attractiveness of cooperation, we obtain the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a. The more risk averse employees are, the less they
will cooperate.
2.4 Risk aversion and employee cooperation under
the relation model
Inspection of condition (5) shows why the relation model generates a
different implication for the effects of risk aversion than the reward
model. Following definition 1, higher risk aversion implies that – ceteris
paribus – the utility of the second best payoff, R, increases. Given our
assumption that the utilities of the best and worst outcomes represented
in (5), U(T), and U(P) are kept constant across different levels of risk
aversion, it is immediately apparent that higher risk aversion decreases
the threshold α∗ in (5). This in turn renders the conditions for coopera-
tion less restrictive as risk aversion increases (cf. Raub and Snijders,
1997, for similar results). The corresponding rival hypothesis of hypoth-
esis 2a is given by hypothesis 2b.
Hypothesis 2b. The more risk averse employees are, the more they
will cooperate.
2.5 Shadow of future, risk aversion, and employee cooperation
We argue that the two different models not only generate different impli-
cations for the effects of risk aversion, but they also make conflicting
predictions for the interaction between the shadow of the future and
employees’ risk attitudes. The view of the reward model emphasizes that
the risk of not receiving the future reward increases if an employee faces
a longer duration of the employment relationship before the reward is
due. The reward argument highlights that the larger the shadow of the
future is, the larger would be the loss that an employee incurs in terms
of foregone future benefits if he distorts the exchange relationship too
early by unilateral defection. Thus, when we take the effects of risk
aversion and of the shadow of the future into account simultaneously,
we obtain different predictions, depending on whether the relation – or
the reward argument is applied.
318 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 21(3)
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More formally, within both models the strength of the effect of the
shadow of the future, α, can be seen as the increase in the attractiveness
of cooperation that obtains if α increases from its theoretical lower
bound, zero, to its theoretical maximum of one. Figure 2 illustrates this
for the example of the delayed reward game for the scenario of U(R*) =
100, U(0) = 0, U(−c) = −2 and t* = 5.
Figure 2 shows how an increase in the shadow of the future affects the
condition for cooperation derived from the delayed reward game. The
condition for cooperation given by (4) is satisfied as soon as α exceeds a
value of about 0.53. At this point, the attractiveness of perpetual cooper-
ation becomes positive. That is, the dashed line exceeds the solid line in
Figure 2. The figure also shows that the distance between the two lines
increases when the shadow of the future, α, increases. According to our
probabilistic interpretation of the condition for cooperation (see note 3),
this implies that the longer the shadow of the future, the higher the like-
lihood for employee cooperation. In the example given, the highest level
of probability is obtained at α = 1, where the attractiveness of perpetual
cooperation approaches 0.1467. This value also indicates the strength of
the effect of the shadow of the future, α, because it shapes the magnitude
of increase between the probability of cooperation at α = 0, where we
assumed the probability to be zero, and the probability at α = 1.
Figure 2 illustrates how, according to the reward model, higher risk
aversion reduces the effect of the shadow of the future. For a given
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Figure 2. Effect of shadow of the future (α) on condition for perpetual cooperation in
delayed reward game. U(R*) = 100, U(0) = 0, U(−c) = −2, t* = 5
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shadow of the future α, higher risk aversion increases, ceteris paribus,
the term on the r.h.s. of inequality (4), but it does not
affect the term on the l.h.s., . As a consequence, the maximal attrac-
tiveness of cooperation that can be attained at a high shadow of the
future (i.e. at α = 1) decreases with risk aversion, which implies that the
possible increase of the probability of cooperation that can be brought
about by an increase of the shadow of the future, likewise decreases.
More analytically, it follows from equation (1) that for every feasible set
of stage game payoffs for the delayed reward game, the attractiveness of
cooperation is negative if α is zero, which implies that the probability of
cooperation is zero under this condition. In this case, the reward will
never be attained, but the investment must be made for one round,
resulting in an expected payoff uC = U(−c) for cooperation that is guar-
anteed to fall below uD = U(0). Mathematically, this also follows from
condition (4). At α = 0, the l.h.s. of (4) evaluates to 0, which by defini-
tion falls below the term on the r.h.s. That is, the attractiveness of coop-
eration is negative at α = 0 and evaluates to (for proof,
see appendix). We also know the attractiveness of cooperation if α = 1.
The limiting value of the attractiveness of cooperation if α approaches
1 is (for proof, see appendix). According to
the reward model, the strength of the effect of the shadow of the future,
strα, is obtained as the difference between the attractiveness of coopera-
tion if α = 1 and the attractiveness of cooperation if α = 0, or technically
(6)
Equation (6) allows deriving the effect of risk aversion on the strength
of the effect of the shadow of the future. Following our definition of the
degree of risk aversion of a utility function, the higher the risk aversion
(ceteris paribus), the larger is U(0). Inspection of equation (6) shows
that higher U(0) decreases the effect of the shadow of the future on
cooperation that is predicted by the delayed reward model. This also fol-
lows from the proof (see appendix) for the effect of risk aversion on the
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Hypothesis 3a. The more risk averse an employee, the smaller the
positive effect of the shadow of the future on cooperation.
Again, the relation argument suggests a different implication. From that
view, risk-averse employees are particularly afraid to distort an ongoing
exchange relationship with their employer. The darker the shadow of the
future, i.e. the longer the employee expects the ongoing exchange to last
if both sides continue to cooperate, the more substantial the loss that the
employee may incur in terms of foregone future benefits would be. As a
consequence, risk-averse employees are particularly motivated to avoid
this loss. Technically, the increase in α of the probability of cooperation
is higher for risk-averse agents than for risk-seeking agents. This fol-
lows from the condition of cooperation for the indefinitely repeated PD,
given by (5), in combination with our probabilistic interpretation of the
attractiveness of cooperation given by the difference between the l.h.s.
and the r.h.s. of this condition α−α∗. At α=0, the probability of cooper-
ation is zero because (5) is never satisfied, at α=1 it increases in 1−α∗.
The term 1−α∗, in turn, increases in risk aversion because, as shown
above, α∗ decreases in risk aversion. Correspondingly, the rival hypoth-
esis for hypothesis 3a reads:
Hypothesis 3b. The more risk averse an employee, the greater the
positive effect of the shadow of the future on cooperation.
3. Method
3.1 Data collection
For the analyses we used two subsamples of data that were collected in
the spring and summer of 2002: one in which risk aversion was mea-
sured in a general way using a lottery question and one in which risk
aversion was measured in terms of job security.
The data used for this study were part of a research program called
‘Solidarity at Work’, which was conducted in the Netherlands between
2000 and 2005 by the Universities of Utrecht and Groningen, funded by
the Netherlands’ Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The pro-
gram had the aim to answer questions on different forms of solidarity and
cooperation in labor organizations. Besides questions on different forms
of cooperative behaviors, structural aspects such as contract form and
career measures were included, but also questions on informal aspects
such as social networks. In this program, three different research strate-
gies were used: (1) structured interviews with experts, (2) a written
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survey among employees and (3) vignette experiments. Fifteen organiza-
tions participated in the written survey and the overall response rate was
52%. The response rate at the university departments was lowest with
24% and at the printing company it was highest with 74%.
Because of the length of the questionnaire, many organizations
demanded that it was shortened before they would cooperate. Therefore,
the participating researchers constructed a modular structure in the
questionnaire, so that sections of questions could be deleted and the
questionnaire could be made shorter. This limited the range of organi-
zations in which these parts could be included for a lot of the parts of
the questionnaire. The sample for the analyses with the lottery question
consists of data gathered in two organizations: a university department
(n = 53), and a printing company (n = 56). The sample for the analyses
with the job-security question consists of three organizations: a univer-
sity department (n = 59), a healthcare organization (n = 91) and a print-
ing company (n = 63). This means that the first subsample consists of
109 respondents and the second subsample of 213 respondents.
3.2 Description of measurements
In the empirical analyses, the supervisor was considered to be the
employer’s representative. Employee cooperation was thus measured
in terms of cooperation with the supervisor. The dependent variable
‘employee cooperation with the employer’ was constructed using the
following five items as suggested by Lindenberg (1998) and as used by
other researchers (e.g. Koster, Sanders, and Van Emmerik 2003; Koster
2005; Koster and Sanders 2006):
• I will help my supervisor to finish the work.
• I am willing to help my supervisor when things have gone wrong for
which nobody can be held responsible.
• I will apologize to my supervisor when I have made a mistake.
• I will try to share the pleasant and less pleasant tasks evenly amongst
my supervisor and me.
• I always live up to the agreements with my supervisor.
The items used for this scale had to be answered using a 7-point Likert
scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78).
The shadow of the future was measured using a variable indicating
the level of contractual job security of the employee. This variable can
obtain three values: when the employee had tenure, a value of three is
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assigned, when the contract is a temporary contract, with the promise of
a tenure, we assigned the value two, and for temporary workers the vari-
able took the value one.4
Risk aversion was measured in two ways: by a lottery question and by
items expressing how much value an employee attaches to keeping her
job. Following Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Jonker (2000), respon-
dents were asked what amount of money they are willing to pay for par-
ticipation in a specified lottery, i.e. a lottery with a 0.1 probability of
winning a prize of 5000 euros. The reservation prize in this particular
lottery was 500 euros. Respondents who were willing to pay that
amount are risk neutral. Respondents who answered they were willing
to pay more are risk seeking, and respondents willing to pay less are risk
averse. We assume risk attitude to be a scale, therefore the answers were
computed into a z-scale and the scale was reversed. This means that a
higher value indicates more risk aversion. Ideally, we would have used
a construct using four more of these lottery questions. However, due to
item non-response this was not possible.
However, risk aversion is not only a personality trait, as employees
may have different degrees of risk aversion depending on their particu-
lar situation. Therefore, we used a second measurement of risk aversion,
i.e. perceived job security, which captures aspects of an employee’s
work situation that affect risk aversion. To construct the scale for job
security we used the following statements:
1. I am afraid of what might happen when I quit my job without having
another job lined up.
2. If I quit, it will be hard to find a new job.
3. If I quit, too much would change.
4. How important is the following to you: to be certain I can work here
for as long as I want.
The first, second and third items are derived from Allen and Meyer’s
(1990) concept of ‘continuance commitment’. We used the items that
expressed in some sense that the employee prefers this job to the uncer-
tainty of no job. We did not use the items that referred to having to work
as a necessity or to working for the organization because it provides bet-
ter earnings than elsewhere. By using these items, we created a proxy
for risk aversion. The fourth item was constructed by the researchers of
the present study. The items used for this scale had to be answered using
a 7-point Likert scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.66). The higher the score
on this scale, the larger the degree of risk aversion, i.e. the more the
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employee prefers the certainty of the current job to the uncertainty of a
new job which may be either better or worse than the current one. This
may hold even when the expected income and their liking of the new job
is the same or – to a certain extent – greater. It should be noted that this
scale does not take into account the extent to which the perception of job
security reflects objective risks (e.g. having a low level of education,
which makes finding a new job more difficult) or other individual char-
acteristics of the respondents. However, in our theoretical analysis the
risk aversion of employees reflects both their perception of the objective
risks they are facing and their personal attitudes towards taking risks.
3.3 Analysis
Because the respondents are clustered in organizations, the data have a
hierarchical structure. Therefore, it may be expected that the answers
will not only be affected by the items, but also by organization-related
characteristics. We therefore decided to use OLS regression, including




In Tables 1 and 2 the means, standard deviations and correlations of the
variables used in the explanatory analyses are displayed for the subsam-
ple where risk aversion was measured with the lottery question and the
job security question, respectively. In this first subsample, the dependent
variable, ‘cooperation with the supervisor’, has a mean of 5.6 (s.d.=1.1),
which is twice the standard deviation above the mid-score of the scale.
This rather high value may result from the fact that it is a self-report on
cooperation.
As for correlations with the dependent variable, we see that people
with more education cooperate less with their supervisor (−0.22,
p<0.01). Concerning the correlations with risk aversion in Table 1, sig-
nificant correlations are found with female (0.22, p<0.01), indicating
that women are more risk averse, and with schooling (−0.33, p<0.01),
meaning that higher educated people are less risk averse. Also, the orga-
nization dummy yields a significant correlation (0.21, p<0.05). This
means that, on average, the employees in the printing company are more
risk averse than in the university.
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In Table 2, mean and standard deviation of the dependent variables
are very similar to those we found in the first subsample. Schooling is
also negatively correlated with cooperation (−0.21, p<0.01). In this table
we find a positive correlation of cooperation and risk aversion (0.14,
p<0.05). We also see that risk aversion is positively correlated with age
(0.27, p<0.01) and the two organization dummies (0.28, p<0.01 and
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Table 1. Correlations and descriptive statistics,
for sample lottery question (N = 109)
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Cooperation with 5.63 1.05
supervisor
2. Age 44.01 10.51 0.04
3. Female 0.32 0.47 −0.02 −0.24**
4. Schooling, years 13.43 3.61 −0.22* −0.17* 0.14†
5. Dummy printing 0.51 0.50 0.12 0.04 −0.35** −0.75**
company
6. Risk aversion 0.08 0.14 −0.05 0.15† −0.22* 0.33** −0.21*
7. Contract security 2.64 0.73 0.02 0.57** −0.15† −0.21* 0.08 0.10
Notes. **= p<0.01, *= p<0.05, †= p<0.1; s.d. = standard deviation.
Table 2. Correlations and descriptive statistics for sample
job-security question (N = 213)
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Cooperation 5.68 1.05
with
supervisor
2. Age 43.83 9.51 0.04
3. Female 0.32 0.47 0.04 −0.15*
4. Schooling, 12.88 3.37 −0.21** −0.11† 0.12*
years
5. Dummy 0.43 0.50 0.08 −0.08 0.03 −0.22**
care org.
6. Dummy 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.08 −0.22* −0.39** −0.56**
printing
comp.
7. Risk 4.53 1.59 0.14* 0.27** −0.09† −0.29** −0.10† 0.28**
aversion
8. Contract 2.78 0.59 0.06 0.41** −0.07 −0.19** 0.24** −0.06 0.20**
security
Note. **= p<0.01, *= p<0.05, †= p<0.1; s.d. = standard deviation.
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0.20, p<0.01 respectively). This means that here the university employ-
ees are more risk averse. Risk aversion is negatively correlated with
schooling (−0.29, p<0.01) indicating that higher educated people are
less risk averse.
4.2 Explanatory analyses
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis explaining employee
cooperation with the supervisor, using the sample where risk aversion
was measured by job-security. Table 4 shows the analyses with risk
aversion measured by the lottery question.
There is no support for hypothesis 1. The contract security measure
does not affect cooperation of employees in any of the analyses in
Tables 3 and 4.
Hypothesis 2 was split into two constituents: the reward hypothesis
(hypothesis 2a) and the relation hypothesis (hypothesis 2b). The first
holds that employees will cooperate less the more risk averse they are,
and the second holds that employees will cooperate more the more risk
averse they are. The different measures of risk aversion show different
results for this hypothesis. In Table 4, using the lottery question, we find
no support for either hypothesis because the corresponding effect is not
significant (B = 0.81, p>0.1). In Table 3, using the job-security ques-
tions, we find a significant effect for this variable when the interaction
variables with the organization dummies are added. This indicates that
risk aversion matters, but that it works differently in different organiza-
tions. We see that the interaction variable of risk aversion and care orga-
nization significantly differs from zero and is negative (B= −0.31,
p<0.01). This shows that in the care organization risk aversion matters
less than in the university department. When also looking at the magni-
tude and direction of the coefficients, we see that risk aversion is asso-
ciated with cooperative behaviors in the university, but that the net effect
is close to zero for the care organization and the printing organization.
The hypothesis that is supported by the data is 2b (relation argument),
but only for employees that work for the university.
Hypothesis 3 also consisted of two competing hypotheses: following
the reward argument, hypothesis 3a holds that the more risk averse
employees are, the smaller the positive effect of the shadow of the future
on cooperation. Hypothesis 3b was derived from the relation view and
holds that the more risk averse employees are, the larger the positive
effect of the shadow of the future. In order to test these competing
hypotheses, in both models interaction variables of risk aversion and
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contract security were added. In the models in Tables 3 and 4 we find no
support for either hypothesis.
With respect to the control variables, Table 3 shows that employee
cooperation with the employer does not differ with age and gender. We
also see that more education is negatively associated with employee
cooperation.
LAMBOOIJ ET AL.: SHADOW OF THE FUTURE, RISK AVERSION 327
Table 3. OLS regression analysis explaining employee cooperation
with the supervisor, risk aversion as job security
B B B Hypothesis
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (direction)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.16 0.20 0.20
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Schooling, years −0.05† −0.06* −0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Dummy care org 0.11 0.00 −0.01
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Dummy printing org. 0.03 −0.04 −0.08
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
University (ref.)
Risk aversion 0.06 0.30** 0.28**
(job security) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) 2a (−), 2b (+)
Contract security 0.01 −0.05 −0.09
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) 1 (+)
Risk aversion * care org. −0.32** −0.31**
(0.11) (0.12)
Risk aversion * print org. −0.29* −0.27†
(0.14) (0.14)
Risk aversion* contract security 0.00 −0.06
(0.09) (0.12) 3a (−), 3b (+)
Risk aversion* care* contract 0.07
(0.18)
Risk aversion* print* contract 0.16
(0.20)
Constant 6.25** 6.38** 6.37**
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.05 0.05
Note. ** = p< 0.01, * = p< 0.05, † = p< 0.1; s.e. = standard error, org. = organization; ref. =
reference category.
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In order to test whether the interaction between the shadow of the
future (job security) and risk aversion varied between organizations, we
included three-way interactions in both models, combining the inter-
action effect predicted by hypotheses 3 with the dummy variables
controlling for organization differences. Here, we find no significant
coefficients.
5. Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we investigated whether and how risk aversion affects
employee cooperation with the employer in long-term labor relations.
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Table 4. OLS regression analysis explaining employee cooperation
with the supervisor, risk aversion as lottery question
B B B Hypothesis
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (direction)
Age 0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female −0.03 −0.07 −0.08
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
Schooling, years −0.10* −0.08† −0.08†
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Dummy printing org. −0.26 −0.20 −0.22
(0.34) (0.34) (0.36)
University department (ref.)
Risk aversion 0.25 −0.78 −0.81 2a (−), 2b (+)
(0.82) (1.02) (1.03)
Contract security −0.08 −0.08 −0.06
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) 1 (+)
Risk aversion* printing company 2.71† 2.58
(1.62) (1.73)
Risk aversion* contract security −1.35 −1.43 3a (−), 3b (+)
(1.23) (1.27)
Risk aversion* printing company* −1.03
contract (4.39)
Constant 6.94** 7.00** 7.04**
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.01 0.06
Note. ** = p< 0.01, * = p< 0.05, † = p< 0.1; s.e. = standard error, org. = organization; ref. =
reference category.
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The mutual-investment model emphasizes that a shadow of the future
supports cooperation in ongoing exchanges between employer and
employee. However, it remains unclear which, in this view, are the
expected effects of risk aversion and how these interact with the
shadow of the future. We distinguished, formalized, and tested two con-
flicting arguments in the literature, both of which turn out to be con-
sistent with the view that a longer shadow of the future increases
cooperation. We showed that according to the relation model, risk aver-
sion should influence employee cooperation positively, and that there
should be a positive interaction between risk aversion and the shadow
of the future on employee cooperation. We also derived that according
to the reward argument, more risk-averse employees should cooperate
less, and that the larger the risk aversion the smaller the effect of the
shadow of the future.
In the empirical analysis, the theoretical expectations were only par-
tially confirmed. We found support for hypothesis 2b, which predicts
that risk aversion favors cooperation. However, this result is only found
for employees of the university organization, in the case of risk aversion
being measured in terms of job security.
As for the theoretical implications, the effects we found do not pro-
vide strong support to either of the two models, but overall they were
somewhat more in line with the relation argument. This would suggest
that the more risk averse people are, the more they cooperate with the
employer. However, our results do not support the expectation that fea-
tures of the incentive structure that increase the shadow of the future,
such as long-term contracts, have a direct effect on employee coopera-
tion, or that they have an indirect effect by strengthening effects of risk
aversion. The results of our analysis also do not suggest that the mutual
investment model of the labor relationship would gain considerably in
predictive power if the individual level characteristic of risk aversion is
taken into account. We find different outcomes for the effect of risk
aversion on cooperation for different types of organizations. We only
find support for the notion that risk aversion favors cooperation in the
university organization. Differences in the organizational (incentive)
structure may be responsible for these differences. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the incentive structure of a university typically resembles more the
assumptions of the reward model, which predicts a negative effect of
risk aversion on cooperation, which is the opposite of what we actually
found for the university. In the university, the incentives based on career
enhancement are likely to be less frequent, but the rewards are also
larger (more similar to one-shot rewards). In the other organizations,
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incentives are more likely to be given in the form of more frequent,
smaller rewards (pay raises, more responsibility, a position with more
influence). The reward model portrays the one-shot situation similar to
the typical career incentives of a university, but it predicts that risk aver-
sion should negatively affect employee cooperation.
Perhaps this can be explained by differences in the clarity of the bound-
ary of the position. In a printing company or a care organization, the tasks
that belong to a particular position are typically more clearly defined than
the tasks of a university professor. It is therefore less clear at the univer-
sity which task should be performed by someone else. This might have
the consequence that the employees at a university are more likely to take
on extra tasks when asked than employees in another organization.
Our paper may also generate some insight into the empirical mea-
surement of risk aversion. We did not find any support for risk aversion
on cooperation when we used the lottery question. Several reasons may
have caused this. The first reason may be that we were not able to con-
struct the scale out of multiple items, but could only use one item. This
could have corrupted the measurement. The second possible reason is
that risk aversion may depend on the interpretation of the situation for
which respondents evaluate the relative attractiveness of different out-
comes. Obviously, an abstract lottery with monetary outcomes is a situ-
ation that is very different from a work environment. This difference
may also affect the degree of risk aversion when it comes to making
actual choices for one of the two situations. Therefore, risk attitude in a
lottery may be uncorrelated with risk aversion with respect to decisions
made at work, such as investments in cooperation. This would mean that
for every situation, different measurements of risk aversion would have
to be constructed, based on the situation in which the data is gathered,
in order to test hypotheses concerning risk aversion.
In this paper, we tried to disentangle two lines of reasoning about
effects of risk aversion on employee cooperation. The two arguments we
inspected are based on very similar assumptions. However, it turned out
that small differences in the assumptions entail opposing expectations
on the effect of risk aversion on employee cooperation. The moderate
support that we found in our empirical study suggests that more research
is needed to understand the effects of risk aversion on employee coop-
eration. We believe that future work should focus in particular on how
the organization specific properties of the incentive structure influence
effects of risk aversion, and on the appropriate measurement of risk atti-
tudes related to workplace decisions.
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Appendix
Derivation of equation (3)
The expected number of rounds of the total game is , and
the expected number of rounds after time point t* is .
Subtracting the second expression from the first expression yields the
expected number of rounds until the reward time t*, .
Derivation of condition (4)
To be shown: uC > uD is equivalent to . As a first
step, we derive from equations (1) and (2) the expected utility of coop-
eration, which yields uC = αt*U(R*)+lcU(−c). The condition for coopera-
tion is that the resulting term exceeds uD = αt*U(0)+lcU(0), which is
equivalent to uC > uD. It becomes apparent after some rearrangement that
this condition is equivalent to αt*(U(R*)−U(0))>lc(U(0)−U(−c)).
Multiplication of both sides of the inequality with (lc(U(R*)−U(0)))−1
yields , due to ((U(R*)−U(0)>0 and lc>0. This result
is equivalent to condition (4).
Derivation of hypothesis 1 for delayed reward game
Hypothesis 1 follows from the analysis of the partial derivative of the attrac
tiveness of cooperation, aC, by α. We defined
(see above). Hypothesis 1 states that the partial derivative of aC by α is
positive, i.e. . The partial derivative is, after some simplification,
obtained as . This expression is
negative iff the numerator is negative, because the denominator is
always larger than zero (excluding the degenerate case α = 1). The con-
dition for a negative numerator is equivalent to αt*+1+t*−a(t*+1)< 0. This
can never be true for the following reasons. First, at α = 0, the l.h.s. term
of this inequality yields t*, which is positive. Second, at α = 1, the l.h.s.
term yields 0. Given this, if the l.h.s. term would be negative anywhere
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positive at some point in this interval (because otherwise it could not
reach from a negative value its value at α = 1, which is 0). However, this
cannot be the case, because the first-order derivative of the l.h.s. subterm
evaluates to αt*(t*+1)−(t*+1), which is guaranteed to be negative given
the preconditions 0 < α < 1 and t*>1. This proves that the attractiveness
for cooperation increases in a. This implies hypothesis 1 if we assume
that there is at least a positive probability that aC is larger than zero
above some point in the interval in which a varies.
Derivation of effect of t* on restrictiveness of condition (4)
To show that the restrictiveness of condition (4) increases in t*, we need to
prove that .We obtain . This expression
is negative iff its denominator is negative. The denominator is negative,
because (l−α)>0, αt*>0 and Log(α)<0 due to 0<α<1.
Derivation of hypothesis 2 for the delayed reward game
To be shown: the higher the risk aversion of utility function U, the lower
is the attractiveness of cooperation in the delayed reward game, all other
things being equal. Definition 1 implies, if risk aversion of utility func-
tion U is higher than risk aversion of utility function V, then U(0) > V(0)
and U(−c) = V(−c) and U(R*) = V(R*). Hence, if the attractiveness of
cooperation decreases strictly in U(0), that is, if , then the
attractiveness of cooperation also decreases in risk aversion of the utility
function. In the following, we show that . The first order
partial derivative of aC by U(0) is obtained as .
This expression is always negative, because the numerator is always
positive and the denominator negative due to U(−c) < U(R*). This
shows that , which proves that the higher the risk aversion of
utility function U, the lower is the attractiveness of cooperation in the
delayed reward game. This implies hypothesis 2a if we assume that
there is at least a positive probability that aC is larger than zero above
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Derivation of the limiting values of attractiveness of cooperation in
delayed reward game
a) Limiting value of aC for α→0.
We show that is always negative at α = 0.
The sub term evaluates to 0 if α = 0. This is also the
limiting value of aC for α→0, because the limit for the numerator is pos-
itive and well defined, and the limit for the denominator is zero.
b) Limiting value of aC for α→1.
The second sub term of aC, , is constant in α. Hence,
the limiting value of aC for α→1 is the difference between the limiting
value of the first sub term, , and the second sub
term. The limiting value can be obtained by application
of the rule of de l’Hôpital. To apply de l’Hôpital’s rule, we need to obtain
the quotient of the partial derivatives in α of the numerator and of the
denominator of this expression. After some simplification, this yields:
(A1)
Applying de l’Hôpital’s rule we obtain from (A1) the limit for α→1
from the limit of the r.h.s. of (A1) for α → 1. This limit evaluates
straightforwardly to (1 + t*)−1, because this is the well-defined value of
the function given by the r.h.s. of (A1) and thus also the limit of for
α → 1. This implies that the limit value of the attractiveness of cooper-
ation if a approaches 1 is .
NOTES
1. Following Knight (1921) authors sometimes distinguish between risk and uncertainty.
Risk refers to a situation in which the probabilities of the possible outcomes are known
to the actors in advance (e.g. in the case of a lottery), and uncertainty refers to a
situation in which the probability of the outcomes are unknown to the actors (see











































LAMBOOIJ ET AL.: SHADOW OF THE FUTURE, RISK AVERSION 333
 at University of Groningen on May 12, 2010 http://rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
similarly uncertainty averse as they are risk averse. Additionally, much sociological
and economic literature uses the term risk in the case of uncertainty and so will we.
2. A utility function is concave if for any two payoffs x and y, the utility that is derived
from the lottery pU(x) + (1−p)U(y), falls below the utility of obtaining the expected
payoff of this lottery for certain.
3. This interpretation reflects the assumption that we have not included all heterogeneity
into our model. For example, suppose for a specific employee i, the values on the l.h.s.
and the r.h.s. of inequality (4) are quasi-normally distributed random variables with
mean values given by the corresponding terms. Then this implies that the higher the
term on the l.h.s. and the smaller the term on the r.h.s., the higher is the likelihood that
the inequality is satisfied and thus cooperation would be chosen by the employee.
4. This operationalization might be criticized for being inconsistent with the theoretical
notion of an indefinite game that we use to formalize the continued reciprocity argu-
ment, because with a non-tenured contract the game is obviously not indefinite.
However, even with a non-tenured contract there is usually some probability of con-
tinuation of the labor relationship, because often employers signal that there is a
prospect of permanent employment in case of satisfactory performance on the part of
the employee.
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